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UNION DISCIPLINE OF ITS MEMBERSHIP
UNDER SECTION 101(a)(5) OF LANDRUM-
GRIFFIN: WHAT IS "DISCIPLINE" AND HOW
MUCH PROCESS IS DUE?
J. Ralph Beaird*
Mack A. Player**
Analogies between criminal trials and union disciplinary
hearings are easily drawn. Both involve charges of prohibited
conduct, the presentation of evidence, and decisions by compe-
tent and impartial tribunals. Whereas one's physical freedom
is at stake in a criminal proceeding, his economic freedom is
often imperiled in a union disciplinary hearing. It is not sur-
prising therefore that the requirements of due process have
been extended to the labor setting. Embodied in section
101(a)(5) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, due process in the union
sphere has been as elusive of definition as in judicial proceed-
ings. Examining section 101(a)(5), Professors Beaird and
Player attempt to clarify this area through a discussion of the
application of the preemption doctrine to the section, the scope
of statutory coverage, the definition of "discipline," and the
section's procedural guarantees.
T he Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(hereinafter Landrum-Griffin Act or LMRDA)l is founded
upon the basic principle that each union member should have the
right to participate in the internal affairs of his union, thereby as-
suring him a voice in fixing the terms and conditions of his employ-
ment. Section 101(a)(5),2 by requiring that union disciplinary pro-
*University Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B., LL.B., University
of Alabama, 1949, 1951; LL.M., George Washington University, 1953.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B., Drury College,
1963; J.D., University of Missouri, 1965, LL.M., George Washington University, 1972. The
authors wish to express their appreciation to Samuel W. Calhoun for his assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
2 LMRDA § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970) provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer
thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B)
given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
Union members disciplined in violation of the section's requirements may enforce its provi-
sion through civil suits brought in the federal district courts pursuant to LMRDA § 102, 29
U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
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ceedings meet certain minimum standards of due process, is essen-
tial to implementation of this principle, for unrestricted disciplinary
action in the surest method of eliminating criticism of union policy.
Despite the seemingly clear language of section 101(a)(5), a great
deal of litigation has been devoted to its interpretation. Accord-
ingly, this Article will review the significant union disciplinary cases
of the past decade in an attempt to delineate the boundaries of the
section's coverage. Part I will examine the application of the
preemption doctrine to section 101(a)(5). Part II will discuss the
parties protected by the section. Part III will consider the crucial
question of what constitutes "discipline." Finally, Part IV will ana-
lyze the particular procedural protections guaranteed by the sec-
tion.
I. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The first question to be considered is whether the preemption
doctrine can be utilized to block suits under section 101(a)(5). In
analyzing this problem, it is therefore necessary to summarize the
law existing prior to Landrum-Griffin and attempt to apply the
statute under discussion in that context.
The major concern of the cases prior to Landrum-Griffin was the
degree to which the administrative jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) preempted judicial action in state
and federal courts. For example, in IAM v. Gonzales3 an expelled
union member brought suit in state court against his union, seeking
reinstatement and consequential damages and claiming that the
expulsion was a violation of his contractual rights with the union.4
Although it recognized that the conduct complained of might con-
stitute an unfair labor practice, 5 the Supreme Court nevertheless
3 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
' Traditional analysis of the relationship between a union and its members was that it was
one of contract. The union constitution and bylaws, when "accepted" by individual members,
became a contract binding on both union and individual. See Polin v. Kaplon, 257 N.Y. 277,
177 N.E. 833 (1931); Beaird & Player, Free Speech and the Landrum.Griffin Act, 25 AA. L.
REv. 577, 581-84 (1973).
1 356 U.S. at 619-20. The Court believed that the Board might construe the union's actions
as violative of § 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) (hereinafter cited
as NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970). That section provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for a union
to cause or attempt to cause an employer . . . to discriminate against an employee
with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated
on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
384 [Vol. 9: 383
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held that the California court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute.
The Court reasoned that restoration of union membership was a
remedy not available to the NLRB,6 and more importantly, that the
purely internal affairs of the union were matters outside the Board's
competence.7
Only a year after Gonzales, the Supreme Court delivered its sem-
inal preemption opinion in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon,5 in which it held that when an activity is "arguably" viola-
tive of the NLRA9 the jurisdiction of both state and federal courts
is preempted by the "exclusive competence" of the NLRB.1W It
should be noted, however, that the Court did nothing to liminate
the distinction made in Gonzales between purely internal union
affairs and matters properly within the Board's jurisdiction. In fact,
the Court cited Gonzales as authority for the principle that respect
for federalism requires preservation of the states' power to regulate
activities of only "peripheral concern" to the NLRA."
Gonzales and Garmon demonstrate that prior to the passage of
LMRDA, the distinction between cases concerning union-member
relationships and those arising in a collective bargaining context
was fairly well established." One would have thought, moreover,
6 356 U.S. at 620-21.
7 Id. at 620. The Court referred to § 8(b)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1970),
which provides that the section does not "impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe
its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ... ." The
Court believed that the controversy before it was governed by this language and that to deny
state court jurisdiction "would in many cases leave an unjustly ousted member without
remedy for the restoration of his important union rights." 356 U.S. at 620.
359 U.S. 236 (1959).
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1970).
"359 U.S. at 245. This statement appears to contradict the idea expressed in Gonzales that
even though a certain union activity might constitute an unfair labor practice state courts
still have jurisdiction. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. It should be pointed out,
however, that at another point in its opinion the Court stated that preemption occurred only
when it was "clear" or could "fairly be assumed" that the activities violated the NLRA. 359
U.S. at 244. This shows that the Garmon decision requires preemption only where there is a
high probability that the challenged conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice-a com-
pletely different situation from Gonzales, where the Court's reference to the chance of
"embedded circumstances" showing a violation of the Act demonstrates that in that case the
probability was very low. 356 U.S. at 619.
" 359 U.S. at 243-44.
For a decision showing that the distinction survived passage of the LMRDA, see Local
100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963). In that case, a union
member, alleging that his union had interfered with his job opportunities, brought suit in a
Texas state court. The Supreme Court concluded that the suit did not focus on purely internal
union matters but rather on the union's actions with respect to the member's efforts to obtain
employment. Id. at 697. Consequently, the matter was governed not by Gonzales but by
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that enactment of Landrum-Griffin would have invalidated the con-
cept of preemption in actions brought under section 101(a)(5). In
the first place, the preemption doctrine is based on congressional
intent, and the LMRDA's grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts
clearly supercedes the idea that judicial action in this area is
preempted by the NLRB.1 3 Furthermore, one rationale of the
preemption doctrine is the prevention of state interference with na-
tional policy. The LMRDA, instead of creating the chance of state
interference, evidences a conscious choice made by Congress to en-
trust enforcement of the new federal rights created by the Act to a
different federal forum." These reasons led one commentator to
conclude that "the preemption doctrine is not relevant to the prob-
lem of whether the federal courts have jurisdiction under the
L.M.R.D.A .....
Despite the strength of the above arguments, some courts in the
early 1960's ruled that they lacked jurisdiction to entertain certain
section 101(a)(5) suits because the alleged conduct arguably consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice. In Beauchamp v. Weeks, 1 for exam-
ple, the court summarily dismissed a section 101(a)(5) suit brought
by a union employee to recover damages from his union for allegedly
causing his employer to suspend him from employment. Construing
the Garmon decision as requiring that the phrase "otherwise disci-
Garmon, and the state court's jurisdiction must yield to the arguable jurisdiction of the
NLRB. Id. at 696-97. For a discussion of Borden, see Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline
Under the Landrum-Griflin Act, 82 HARv. L. REv. 727, 754-55 (1969). Any remaining vitality
of Gonzales was largely eviscerated by the Court in Amalgamated Ass'n v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274 (1971). In Lockridge, an employee was removed from the union allegedly for nonpay-
ment of dues. His union caused his discharge from employment under a valid union security
clause. The member recovered damages in state court on the ground that under union rules
he was still a "member" and the union violated that rule by dismissing him from the union
and causing his discharge. Relying largely upon the fact that the member was not seeking
reinstatement in the union, but was seeking relief that the NLRB could provide under sec-
tions 8(b)(1) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA, the Supreme Court reversed the state court judgment.
The Court admitted that Gonzales could not survive Garmon, but rather than overruling
Gonzales, the Court limited that holding to those situations where the suit "focused upon
purely internal matters." Lockridge's suit focused on the employment relationship and thus
did not qualify.
11 For example, enforcement of contract rights, Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195
(1962), and the duty of fair representation, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), were not
subject to preemption as Congress was held to have intended parallel remedies by enacting
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
" Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 755.
15 Id.
Is 48 L.R.R.M. 3048 (S.D. Cal. 1961); see Rinter v. Local 24, Lithographers, 201 F. Supp.
204 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
[Vol. 9: 383
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plined" in section 101(a)(5) be strictly construed, the court con-
cluded that the alleged conduct did not constitute disciplinary ac-
tion within the meaning of the section, but rather was a matter
within the exclusive competence of the Board."
The weight of authority, however, soon recognized the inapplic-
ability of preemption to Landrum-Griffin suits. In Parks v. IBEW,'8
the Fourth Circuit held that a district court had jurisdiction to hear
actions brought under section 101(a)(5) even though the matter
might also be within the competence of the NLRB. The court em-
phasized that Landrum-Griffin created new federal rights in favor
of union members and that it would be contrary to congressional
intent to require them to wait for a determination by the Board
before enforcing those rights in the federal courts.'" Similarly, in
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Braswell,"0 the Fifth
Circuit emphatically rejected the applicability of the Garmon doc-
trine to section 101(a)(5) suits, emphasizing that the primary pur-
pose of Garmon was "to prevent conflicts between federal and state
policy," and that if there were any conflict at all here, it was "be-
tween two federal organs expressing federal policy."'" Furthermore,
even if the conduct were arguably subject to the NLRA, the court
believed that the clear congressional intent that federal courts have
jurisdiction to entertain section 101(a) (5) suits took precedence over
application of the Garmon doctrine.Y
Any division of authority as to the relevance of the preemption
doctrine to section 101(a)(5) suits was resolved by the Supreme
Court in International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman.2
In that case a union member sued his union, alleging that he had
been expelled without the full and fair hearing guaranteed by sec-
tion 101(a)(5). The union argued that under Garmon the federal
courts had no jurisdiction because the gravamen of the complaint
was discrimination in job referrals, which was at least arguably an
unfair labor practice.
The Supreme Court flatly rejected the union's argument and
stated that the critical issue presented by the claim was whether
17 48 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
,Id. at 922-23. See Rekant v. Local 446, Meat Cutters, 320 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1963); Plant
v. Local 199, Laborers', 324 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Del. 1971).
388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1968).
21 Id. at 196. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
21 388 F.2d at 196. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
401 U.S. 233 (1971).
1975]
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there had been a full and fair hearing within the meaning of section
101(a)(5). 21 Such a claim was not within the exclusive competence
of the NLRB for several reasons. The Court noted first that the
preemption doctrine was based on the theory that cases involving
issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges, and
those requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, should not
be kept from administrative agencies created by Congress. Neither
of these factors appeared in the present case. 25 Furthermore, the
Court emphasized that Congress believed section 101(a)(5) added
new protections to federal labor law.2 1 More importantly, Congress
explicitly referred claims under the section to the federal district
courts, not to the NLRB.2 Finally, the Court was careful to point
out that allowing the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction in section
101(a)(5) actions does not contravene any of the principles estab-
lished by prior decisions.2 1 Since Hardeman, therefore, it is abun-
dantly clear that claims of preemption are improper in suits under
section 101(a)(5).
II. WHO IS PROTECTED?
The scope of section 101(a)(5) is limited by its terms to members
of labor organizations.2 9 A major question has been whether such
language includes union officials who have been removed from office
without the prescribed procedural rights. In Grand Lodge of 1AM v.
King,3" discharged union officials claimed that their summary re-
moval from office was in violation of section 101(a)(5). The court
concluded, however, that the section does not apply to such actions
since removal is not "discipline" within the meaning of this particu-
z, Id. at 237.
28 Id. at 238.
21 Id. at 239.
v Id.
28 Id. at 240-41. In reference to the Garmon decision, the Court noted that the case stood
for two basic principles: (1) that state law could not regulate conduct either protected or
prohibited by the NLRA and (2) that where it was unclear whether conduct was left to state
regulation, that determination should be made by the NLRB. Id. at 240. The Court concluded
that the case before it did not infringe upon either of these principles. In the first place, there
was no attempt "to apply state law to matters pre-empted by federal authority." Id. at 241.
Furthermore, since the law to be applied in § 101(a)(5) actions was "federal law explicitly
made applicable to such circumstances by Congress, there [was] no danger that state law
[might] come in through the back door to regulate conduct that [had] been removed by
Congress from state control." Id. at 241.
2 See note 2 supra.
- 355 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
[Vol. 9: 383
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lar subsection of the statute.31 It emphasized that Congress had
explicitly excluded such cases from the section's coverage because
to include them would "permit wrongdoing union officials to remain
in control while the time-consuming 'due process' requirements of
the section were met."32
3 t
-The officers in King also claimed violations of §§ 101(a)(1), 101(a)(2) and 609 of the
LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1), 411(a)(2) and 529 (1970), respectively. The first two sections
guarantee union members equal political rights and freedom of speech and assembly. The
union argued that these guarantees do not extend to members who are also officers. 335 F.2d
at 343. In rejecting this contention, the court emphasized that there was nothing in either
the statutory language or legislative history of those sections to imply that officer-members
were to be excluded. Id. Furthermore, to do so would contravene the sections' purpose of
strengthening internal union democracy by denying "protection to those best equipped to
keep union government vigorously and effectively democratic." Id. at 344.
Since the plaintiffs were protected by §§ 101(a)(1) and (a)(2), the court believed that they
had stated a claim which was sufficient under either § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970), or § 609
of the LMRDA. For present purposes, the discussion of § 609 is the more important, for
through it the court restored to officers some of the protection against removal which it had
denied them by its interpretation of § 101(a)(5). See Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 737.
Section 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization or any officer, agent, shop steward,
or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine, sus-
pend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which
he is entitled under the provisions of this Act. The provisions in section 102 [29 U.S.C.
§ 412 (1970)] shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.
The crucial inquiry was the meaning of the words "otherwise discipline." The union argued
that the phrase should be read "as not including removal from union office, since the same
words [had] that restricted meaning in section 101(a)(5)." 335 F.2d at 344. Although admit-
ting that this contention is plausible, the court believed "that identical words may be used
in the same statute, or even in the same section of a statute, with quite different meanings."
Id. When this happens it is the duty of the courts to give the words a meaning consistent
with legislative intent. Id. at 344-45. The court concluded that Congress did not intend that
"otherwise discipline" in § 609 should exclude removal from union office. In the first place,
the purpose of § 609 differed greatly from the purpose of § 101(a)(5). While § 101(a)(5)
guarantees to union members an independent right of procedural due process, § 609 is not a
source of new rights, but an enforcement provision designed "to effectuate rights conferred
in other sections of the Act by making it unlawful to punish members who seek to exercise
such rights." Id. at 345. Such punishment was prohibited "whether inflicted summarily or
after a full panoply of procedural protections." Id. Furthermore, the purpose of the limiting
gloss upon the words "otherwise discipline" in § 101(a)(5) was "to protect unions from
continuing depredations while charges [against officers were] being investigated and re-
solved." Id. This purpose would not be furthered by imposing "the same restriction upon the
same words in section 609, since that section has nothing to do with whether or not discipline
is summary." 335 F.2d at 345.
The King court's interpretation of § 609 has been followed by numerous other decisions.
E.g., Wood v. Dennis, 84 L.R.R.M. 2662 (7th Cir. 1973); Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1969). See Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at
737-38. Contra, Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1962).
= 335 F.2d at 341-42.
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The King court's interpretation of section 101(a)(5) has been uni-
versally followed, making the section inapplicable when an officer
alleges only that he has been summarily removed from office."I If,
however, removal is accompanied by other forms of discipline, the
section may be applicable." In Lewis v. American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees,35 for example, it was held
that an officer who had been expelled from union membership in
addition to being removed from office was entitled to the procedural
guarantees of section 101(a) (5).
Another form of discipline which has been held to entitle a dis-
charged officer to the protections of section 101(a)(5) is the imposi-
tion by the union of restrictions on the officer's right to seek union
office. Martire v. Laborers Local 10580 involved a union business
agent who had been discharged, fined, and barred from union office
for five years. Although the court recognized that section 101(a)(5)
does not protect the officer from summary removal, it concluded
that the part of the penalty which barred the officer from office
affected "his status qua union member," and thus afforded him a
remedy under the section.37 A similar result was reached in
Schonfeld v. Penza,5 an action brought by a union secretary-
treasurer who had been removed from office and declared ineligible
to run for re-election. The Schonfeld court also recognized that mere
removal from office gave the plaintiff no right of action under sec-
-" E.g., Nelms v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 405 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1968); Air Line
Stewards Local 550 v. Transport Workers Union, 334 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 972 (1965); McKee v. Sales Drivers Local 166, 82 L.R.R.M. 3126 (C.D. Cal. 1973);
Hartner v. Baltimore Regional Joint Bd. of Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 339 F. Supp.
1257 (D. Md. 1972); Brogg v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 313 F. Supp. 6 (S.D.
Ala. 1970); Gulickson v. Forest, 290 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Mamula v. Local 1211,
Steelworkers, 202 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
The King court expressly stated that its holding did not encompass the question of
whether § 101(a)(5) would be applicable when a union official is "fined, suspended, expelled,
or otherwise disciplined," other than by suspension or removal from office. 335 F.2d at 342
n.8.
407 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir. 1969). See note 37 infra.
419 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1969).
Id. at 35. See Hartner v. Baltimore Regional Joint Bd. of Amalgamated Clothing Work.
ers, 339 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Md. 1972); Mamula v. Local 1211, Steelworkers, 202 F. Supp. 348
(W.D. Pa. 1962); notes 79-87 and accompanying text infra. Contra, Verbiscus v. Industrial
Union of Marine Workers, 238 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich. 1964). With reference to the fine,
the Martire court, citing the Lewis decision, stated that if the plaintiff were subject to
expulsion for failure to pay he must be afforded the protection of § 101(a)(5). 410 F.2d at 35;
see text accompanying note 35 supra.
477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 9: 383
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tion 101(a)(5),39 but the court concluded that "rendering a man
ineligible from seeking union office. . . affects him as a member
and permits him under the Act to challenge the fairness of the
procedures resulting in such political exile."4 Thus, the general rule
remains that summary removal from office does not constitute "dis-
cipline" within section 101(a)(5), but, when combined with addi-
tional sanctions, the due process requirements of the statute are
applicable.
III. WHAT IS DISCIPLINE?
Section 101(a)(5) provides procedural guarantees only when a
union member has been "fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined."4 Thus, it has become important to determine the
meaning of "otherwise disciplined." The two major questions con-
sidered are whether "discipline" includes (A) union action which
interferes with a member's employment relationship and (B) union
action which deprives a member of the right to run for union office.
As will become apparent in this discussion, examination of this
issue necessarily overlaps the question of who is protected-the
topic analyzed in the previous section.
A. Interference with the Employment Relationship
A number of decisions have held as a matter of law that union
action which affects only a member's employment relationship does
not constitute discipline within the meaning of section 101(a)(5). In
Allen v. Armored Car Chauffeurs & Guards Local 820,2 a union
member sued his union under section 101(a)(5) for failing to prose-
cute a grievance against his employer relating to his discharge from
employment. In discussing the complaint, the court emphasized
that the section does not grant jurisdiction for discipline in the form
of discharge from employment, but only for union discipline of a
member as to his membership.4 3 Similar reasoning was used by the
court in Lucas v. Kenny,4" where a union member had charged his
"Id. at 904.
Q Id.
" See note 2 supra.
a 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1960).
a Id. at 494-95. See Stout v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Dist. Council, 226 F. Supp.
673 (N.D. IM. 1963); Green v. Local 705, Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 220 F. Supp. 505
(E.D. Mich. 1963); Rinker v. Local 24, Lithographers, 201 F. Supp. 204 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
See also Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 731-33.
" 220 F. Supp. 188 (NJD. M11. 1963).
1975]
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union with violating its obligation to secure and assign him work.
The court dismissed the complaint, holding that the charge was
unrelated to section 101(a)(5) because the union action in question
did not concern the "union-member relationship."4 Finally, in
Seeley v. Brotherhood of Painters,4" the court refused to apply sec-
tion 101(a)(5) to an action brought by a supervisor who was an
inactive union member, charging that the union had conspired with
his employer to have him dismissed from his job. The court's con-
clusion was premised on the idea that "discipline" under section
101(a)(5) only includes union actions affecting membership in the
union.47 As a supervisor, the only membership interests the plaintiff
could have were seniority and fringe benefits." Since it did not
appear that either of these interests had been infringed, the com-
plaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The idea that "discipline" includes only union action which
affects membership status is unnecessarily narrow. An enormous
loophole is created in the protections of section 101(a)(5), through
which unions could often punish members at the workbench rather
than in the union hall. It has been argued that such a restrictive
doctrine fails "to recognize that the right not to be disciplined ex-
cept in conformity with section 101(a)(5) is itself a positive right of
every union member. . . ."" Furthermore, decisions such as Allen,
Lucas, and Seeley give no justification "for passing over the ordi-
nary meaning of the word 'discipline' in favor of a specialized, lim-
ited one."5" Finally, the concept is deficient "because it arbitrarily
excludes from the protection of the Act (L.M.R.D.A.) a large sector
of the traditional penal systems of unions, which have never con-
fined their sanctions to limitations on 'membership' rights.""1
Fortunately, the weight of authority is to the effect that union
interference with the employment relationship can constitute "dis-
cipline." In the leading case of Detroy v. American Guild of Variety
Artists, 2 a union member was blacklisted by his union after he
refused to comply with an arbitrator's award which was based on a
finding that he had violated his employment contract. The union
argued that blacklisting does not constitute discipline within the
Is Id. at 190.
41 308 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
'1 Id. at 59.
,s Id.
"1 Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 731.
50 Id.
31 Id.
52 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
[Vol. 9: 383
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meaning of section 101(a)(5). In rejecting the argument, the court
emphasized that unions enforce the contracts made by their mem-
bers with employers because such enforcement benefits all union
members by promoting stability within the industry. Conse-
quently, blacklisting of members who violated their contracts was
an "act of self-protection."54 The court believed that a union which
furthers its own ends in this manner must abide by the rules pre-
scribed by section 101(a)(5) and that any member punished by the
union in the interest 6f promoting the welfare of the group is entitled
to the section's guarantees. 51
Other courts have agreed with the Detroy court's holding that
interference with the employment relationship does not as a matter
of law exclude judicial consideration of the union's action under
section 101(a)(5).16 It is unclear whether these decisions totally
reject the "affect membership=affect employment" distinction,
thereby including all union interference with the employment rela-
tionship within the meaning of "discipline" or whether they hold
that such interference can constitute "discipline," but only when
interference with employment results in a detrimental effect on
union membership status.
Several decisions tend to support the conclusion that some effect
on membership status is necessary to trigger the due process protec-
tions of section 101(a)(5). In Rekant v. Local 446, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters,5 7 the union rescinded a resolution, which had granted
a jobless union member temporary replacement work, because he
had failed to appear at work punctually and had unsatisfactorily
performed his duties. The member claimed that this action had
been taken without affording him the rights guaranteed by section
101(a)(5). Although the court ultimately rejected the member's
claim,5  it did agree that the union action came within the defini-
tional ambit of section 101(a) (5) .Jt is crucial to note, however, that
the court reached this conclusion only because the evidence demon-
strated that the sanction against the member "went to the heart"
of the union-member relationship.59
-Id. at 81.
5Id.
"Id. For another decision holding that blacklisting constitutes discipline, see Burris v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
"See, e.g., Smith v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 80 L.RR.M. 3063 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Gross v. Kennedy, 183 F. Supp. 750 (SD.N.Y. 1960).
320 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1963).
See note 65 and accompanying text infra.
, 320 F.2d at 276.
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A similar analysis was applied in Scovile v. Watson." There a
union member who had been discharged from her job argued that
the union's adoption of a resolution denying arbitration rights to
any employee with a record of excessive absenteeism constituted
disciplinary action. The union contended that under the collective
bargaining agreement, "the union, rather than the aggrieved em-
ployee, had the right to proceed or not to proceed to arbitration."' ,
Moreover, any rights of the member "to require the union to de-
mand arbitration. . . were not secured by her union membership
but were derived from the collective bargaining agreement.""2 In
rejecting this argument, the court held that even though the right
asserted might be derivative, refusal by a union to prosecute an
arbitrable grievance under some circumstances "might be consid-
ered as a disciplinary measure relating to the employee's member-
ship in the union."3 Thus, although recognizing the abstract propo-
sition that interference with employment rights can constitute "dis-
cipline" under section 101(a)(5), Rekant and Scovile do not greatly
expand the previously criticized 4 interpretation that requires im-
pact on the individual's rights qua the union. Both decisions appear
to preclude a finding of discipline based on interference with the
employment relationship alone. The plaintiff must establish a
nexus between the injured employment right and the rights of the
plaintiff as a union member.
Even when the union action has an adverse impact on member-
ship status, Rekant and Scovile indicate circumstances wherein the
court might not consider the action "discipline." In Rekant, the
court held that the union's rescinding resolution was not discipline
under section 101(a)(5) because it did not deprive the member of
employment; he had already done that himself by his incompetence
and unsatisfactory behavior.65 Undoubtedly, the court was also im-
pressed by the fact that this initial grant of work to the unemployed
worker was in the nature of a "privilege" or gratuity by the members
10 338 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 (1965).
,Id. at 680.
Id. The union cited Allen v. Armored Car Chauffeurs Local 820, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J.
1960), in support of its argument that its actions did not constitute discipline. See text
accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
0 338 F.2d at 680 (emphasis added). For the court's reasoning that under the circumstances
the union's action was not "discipline" see text accompanying notes 67.68 infra.
64 See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
13 320 F.2d at 276-77. The court noted that no employer would have hired him even if the
resolution had not been rescinded.
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that could be withheld at will, rather than a "right" held by virtue
of his membership in the organization." In Scovile, the court
stressed that the union's resolution "was prospective and applied to
the entire membership, and not to plaintiff alone." As it was a
matter of union policy, it could "hardly be said" to be disciplineO
within the meaning of the statute.69
Recently, the case of Hayes v. Local 481, IBEWO followed the
Scovile doctrine. A member's classification as journeyman wireman
was terminated when he failed to complete four successful semesters
of training. The requirement that retention of journeyman status
depends upon completion of the training program "applied to all
persons in the program and not just the plaintiff," and the require-
ment was a "policy matter of internal union concern."" On this
basis, the court ruled that termination of the classification was not
"discipline."
Other courts have emphasized the "uniform rule" concept in
holding that union interference with employment is not "discipline"
within section 101(a) (5). In Figueroa v. National Maritime Union, 2
the union, without a hearing, refused to register three members in
its hiring hall or refer them for employment because of their past
narcotics convictions. The members claimed that they had been
"Public administrative law at one time made distinctions between "rights" and
"privileges," the former being surrounded by protections and procedural due process, and the
latter being subject to summary revocation. See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113
(1940); Smith v. Iowa Liquor Control Comm'n, 169 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 1969); House of To-
bacco, Inc. v. Calvert, 394 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1965). See also W. GLusioRz & C. BYas, ADmmaS-
T Trm LAw 600-07 (6th ed. 1974). In recent years this doctrine has been substantially eroded
if not eliminated. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); McNell v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973); Holmes v. New York City Housing
Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Dixon v. Alabama St. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir. 1961). However, as no state action is involved in union discipline cases, there is no
particular reason why this distinction could not be maintained under the LMRDA.
17 338 F.2d at 680.
0 Id.
n This distinction between "rule making" and "adjudication" has a sound basis in general
administrative law. A rule of prospective uniform application need not be preceded by the
procedural protections accorded by adjudications concerning the application of a rule to a
particular set of facts. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.
1966). See also Bell, Administrative Law: Rule Making and a "Hearing. "A Tale of Two Cases
(Three Rules) or What the Dickens!, 8 GA. L. REv. 19 (1973); Crampton, A Comment an Trial-
Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585 (1972).
" 83 LR.R.M. 2647 (D. Ind. 1973).
71 Id. at 2648.
72 342 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1965).
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denied the procedural guarantees of section 101(a)(5). In dismissing
the complaint, the court noted that the union's "refusal to register
and refer was pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment and in compliance with the declared policy of the shipowners
that they [would] hire no seaman known to have a narcotics con-
viction. 73 Since the members had "admitted their convictions and
the applicability to them of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement," the union's action "was no more 'discipline' . . . than
it would have been to turn down an applicant who admitted that
he lacked a physical requirement for the job . . . *t4
Another decision which utilizes this "self-admission" factor is
Williams v. International Typographical Union." There a printer
was reclassified from "working at the trade" to "not working at the
trade" when the union became aware of his full-time job with the
United States. In holding that this action did not constitute disci-
pline, the court emphasized that the member "readily admitted his
government employment prior to his reclassification and [had]
done so ever since. ' '76
It is hard to criticize the result reached in the Scovile, Hays,
Figueroa and Williams line of cases. Nonetheless, the process by
which the courts reached their result leaves much to be desired. The
courts appear to have looked to the result they desired-dismissal
of the complaint-and to have feared that if they called the union
action "discipline" they could not reach that result. Thus, their
definition of the term "discipline" was contorted beyond recogni-
tion.
The courts were correct in their tacit recognition that imposition
7 Id. at 406.
1, Id. It is important to note, however, that the court pointed out that had the members
disputed the fact of their convictions, the union's determination that they had been convicted
would have constituted discipline. Id. See Tirino v. Local 164, Bartenders, 282 F. Supp. 809
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), wherein union members charged by their union with engaging in a wildcat
strike sought to enjoin the union from conducting an intraunion trial against them, The union
moved for summary judgment on a number of grounds, one of which was that there had been
no discipline within the meaning of § 101(a)(5). In rejecting the union's argument, the court
cited Figueroa as authority for its conclusion that since the members here vigorously denied
that they had engaged in a wildcat strike, the union's actions against them might be found
to constitute "discipline" if they could establish their claim that the actions were based on
the union's predetermination that they had participated in such a strike. Id, at 817.
73 423 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). See Hayes v. Local 481,
IBEW, 83 L.R.R.M. 2647 (D. Ind. 1973).
1, 423 F.2d at 1297. The court also stressed the reasonableness of the classification scheme
and its fair application to the plaintiff. Id.
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of a prospective rule of uniform application is in the nature of a
legislative act wherein individual procedural due process has little
or no application. The enactment of such a rule, in itself, is not
discipline.7 However, when the rule is applied to individual mem-
bers to deny employment opportunities, the union at that point is
utilizing its position to injure the member, and this result must be
considered "discipline."
Accepting that application of a union rule to deny employment
as "discipline" does not necessarily mean that a "due process" hear-
ing is always required. Failure to recognize this principle is the point
at which the courts went astray. When an incontestably valid rule
is in existence and when the rule, without dispute, applies to a
particular union member, there is simply no denial of "due process"
for the union to take summary action. Union tribunals, like courts
of law, need not give full evidentiary hearings if no facts are in
dispute. Thus, when a union rule requires certain prerequisites for
a classification and the member is denied employment because he
does not have the classification, this must be considered "disci-
pline." If, however, the rule is valid and the facts admitted make
the rule applicable, section 101(a) (5) does not require a full eviden-
tiary hearing, and the court, as a matter of law, need not order one.
Likewise, if the union has a collective agreement not to supply work-
ers with certain backgrounds, the refusal to refer an individual
member will be "discipline." If there is a factual dispute as to
whether the rule applies to the particular member, section 101 (a) (5)
is fully applicable because a full hearing is necessary to determine
the propriety of the union's disciplinary action. On the other hand,
even though the union action in refusing referral is "discipline"
within the meaning of the statute and a hearing is not accorded,
II There may well be a problem in determining whether action is "rule making" or
"adjudicatory," a problem frequently encountered in administrative law. See note 69 supra.
Although the extremes are easy to distinguish, when action has retrospective impact and
affects a relatively few individuals, the distinction between the two types of action is quite
difficult. For instance, in Scovie it might be argued that the action denying arbitration to
the plaintiff because of her absenteeism was retrospective in nature (punishment for past
acts) and applicable solely to her particular circumstances. It thus took on the hue of an
individual adjudication as to whether arbitration should be pursued in her case. If this were,
in fact, an individual adjudication not to pursue arbitration, as opposed to a prospective rule
relating to when arbitration would be pursued, § 101(a)(5) would seem to require a hearing.
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section 101(a)(5) is not violated if the employee admits that the rule
is factually applicable to him. In such a case, the due process hear-
ing is unnecessary to determine the propriety of the action and is
thus an exercise in futility which the courts need not require.
The courts have recognized as much by saying that the denial of
a classification is "discipline" when there is a factual dispute, but
that the same denial of a classification is not "discipline" when no
factual dispute exists."h Such a double meaning of "discipline" dis-
torts analysis and invites serious error in result. It is "discipline" to
deny an employee employment opportunities by virtue of the
union's exercise of its power and position. The only question remain-
ing is whether the basis of the dispute is factual in nature. If it is, a
full evidentiary hearing with the protections granted in section
101(a)(5) is required. If no facts are in dispute, section 101(a)(5) is
not violated by a failure to have a full hearing.
B. Deprivation of the Right of Candidacy
As previously demonstrated, section 101(a)(5) does not grant
union officers procedural protection against summary removal."
Moreover, Title I of the LMRDA does not guarantee union members
the right to run for union office. The right of candidacy, however,
is specifically protected by Title IV of the Act."0 Thus, several courts
have held that deprivation of the right of candidacy is not action-
able under section 101 (a) (5), but only through a suit brought by the
Secretary of Labor as prescribed by Title IV. In Boiling v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters s' for example, a union member
claimed that he had been "disciplined" by his union when it denied
him the right to run for president and business manager. The court
rejected this argument, holding that the member's right to be a
candidate was governed exclusively by Title IV and that to permit
him to enforce this right under section 101(a)(5) "would in effect
circumvent and render largely meaningless the enforcement proce-
dures provided" in that Title.12 A similar result was reached in
n See note 74 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
" LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) provides: "In any election . . . every member In
good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to. . . reasonable
qualifications uniformly imposed) . .. .
, 224 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
Id. at 20-21. See Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1962); Etelson &
Smith, supra note 12, at 739.
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Verbisus v: Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 8 where the court
held that a union officer who had been removed from office, fined
and disqualified from holding any office for ten years must seek
relief pursuant to Title IV rather than under Title I.
Despite these holdings, several recent decisions demonstrate that
deprivation of the right of candidacy does constitute "discipline"
within the meaning of section 101(a)(5). As previously noted, both
the Martire and Schonfeld decisions hold that union action prohib-
iting a discharged union officer from running for office affects his
membership rights and is therefore actionable under section
101(a) (5).184 What is most interesting about the decisions, however,
is that neither court mentions the conflict with the cases construing
Title IV as the exclusive remedy for deprivation of the right to run
for office.8s
Notwithstanding this failure, it is submitted that the result
reached by Martire and Schonfeld is beneficial, for Title IV inade-
quately protects the right of candidacy. It has been noted that,
"[n]ot only must the Secretary's suit await the holding of the
election, but [he] has virtually complete discretion as to whether
or not to prosecute a complaint filed with him by the union mem-
ber.""6
Including deprivation of the right of candidacy within the defini-
tion of "discipline" affords better protection for the right than does
Title IV, and arguably does not in any way conflict with that title.
Under Title IV, the Secretary is bound to act in the public interest
and is not required "to protect the interests of the complaining
member if, in [his] judgment, to do so would not further the ad-
ministration" of the title. 7 The rights guaranteed by section
101(a) (5), however, are vested by the statute in the individual union
member. Consequently, if those rights are violated, it should be
238 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
' See notes 35-40 and accompanying text supra.
It should be pointed out that the Schonfeld court did rely on Title IV in disagreeing with
the district court's holding that the officer's dismissal and disqualification supported a Title
I action by union members for violation of their § 101(a)(1) right to nominate candidates for
union office. See Schonfeld v. Penza, 360 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afl'd, 477 F.2d 899
(2d Cir. 1973). But cf. Schonfeld v. Raftery, 335 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court's
use of the Title IV argument in this context makes its failure to mention it in connection with
the officer's claim even more noticeable.
" Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 740.
vId.
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irrelevant that in the act of violating them the union may also have
violated a provision of Title IV.m
IV. PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES
In order to insure the accomplishment of its "due process" goals,
section 101(a)(5) contains a number of procedural guarantees.
A. Written Notice of Specific Charges
The first specific procedural right guaranteed by section
101(a)(5)(A) is the provision that no member can be disciplined
until he has been "served with written specific charges."8 The
major questions of interpretation with respect to this right have
been (1) whether a member may be disciplined for an offense not
specified in the union constitution and (2) what information the
charge must contain to meet the requirement of specificity.
1. Non-Specified Offenses.-Until recently, it was well estab-
lished that a union could discipline its members only for offenses
stated in its constitution. In Simmons v. Local 713, Textile
Workers" for example, a member was disciplined for "non-
cooperation," an offense not mentioned in the union constitution.
The court, in affirming a jury verdict for the member, held that a
union could not discipline its members "except for offenses stated
in its constitution and by-laws, and that the courts [lacked] the
power to recognize 'implied offenses' ... ."" In the landmark deci-
sion of International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman,92
however, the Supreme Court radically changed the law.
Hardeman involved a union member who had been disciplined for
violation of two provisions of the union constitution-article twelve,
which forbade any threat of force against a union officer to prevent
him from discharging his duties, and article thirteen, which prohib-
ited attempts to create dissension within the union. The district
court, after examining the transcript of the union disciplinary pro-
ceeding, concluded that there was no evidence to support the mem-
83 Id.
See note 2 supra.
350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965); cf. Local 455, Boilermakers v. Terry, 398 F.2d 491 (5th
Cir. 1968); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Allen v. International Alliance of Theatrical Employees, 338 F.2d
309 (5th Cir. 1964).
", 350 F.2d at 1017.
92 401 U.S. 233 (1971).
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ber's conviction for violation of the article thirteen prohibition and,
consequently, that the general guilty verdict returned by the union
tribunal could not stand.93 This holding was based on an earlier
appellate decision which had construed article thirteen as applying
not to merely personal altercations, but only to "threats to the union
as an organization and to the effective carrying out of the union's
aims." 4 On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit."
In reversing, the Supreme Court examined the legislative history
of section 101(a)(5), and concluded that it demonstrated nothing
which justified "such a substitution of judicial for union authority
to interpret the union's regulations . "..."I' The Court emphasized
that the language in the section's original version which would have
forbidden discipline "except for breach of a published written rule"
was subsequently eliminated. 7 Furthermore, the Court noted a re-
mark by Senator Goldwater in which he explicitly stated that the
section did not require that the charges served upon a member "be
based on activity that the union had proscribed prior to the union
member having engaged in such activity."" Since this history
showed that a union could discipline "its members for offenses not
proscribed by written rules at all," the Court held that it is "a futile
exercise for a court to construe the written rules in order to deter-
mine whether particular conduct falls within or without their
scope.""9
It is interesting to note that the Court did not even mention cases
such as Simmons which had restricted union disciplinary power to
offenses specified in the union constitution. Nevertheless, in view of
the Court's unequivocal language, the conclusion is inescapable
that those cases have been overruled and that presently discipline
may be imposed for an offense regardless of whether it is enumer-
ated in the union constitution.' 9
" Id. at 242.
11 Id., quoting International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968).
,5 Hardeman v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 420 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1969).
"401 U.S. at 242-43. Accord, Smith v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 80 L.R.R.M. 3063.
3067 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see Kiepura v. Local 1091, Steelworkers, 358 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. I.
1973), wherein the court stated that it lacked the authority "to inquire into the merits of the
charges brought against" a union member. Id. at 990.
17 401 U.S. at 243.
Is Id. at 244.
21 Id. at 244-45.
'0 But see Boggs v. MBEW, 326 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mont. 1971), wherein the court, in holding
that certain union disciplinary action was improper, emphasized that the sections of the
1975]
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2. Specificity.-Unlike the law pertaining to offenses not speci-
fied in the union constitution, the rules regulating the specificity
required of the notice of charges were not significantly changed by
the Hardeman decision. Prior to that case, it was firmly established
that although union officials are not required "to frame their
charges and specifications technically as formal legal pleadings, '"' 1
they must draft them so "as to inform a member with reasonable
particularity of the details of the charges."102 At minimum, "reason-
able particularity" requires a showing of the circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged disciplinary infraction and the time and place
of the infraction, as nearly as can be ascertained." 3
Hardeman in effect affirmed these basic concepts. The Court
noted that the charges must be "specific enough to inform the ac-
cused member of the offense that he has allegedly committed."'' In
addition, when the charges refer to specific written provisions, the
federal courts have authority to examine them to "determine
whether the union member had been misled or otherwise prejudiced
in the presentation of his defense."'0 5 Here, however, examination
of the union transcript revealed that the notice complied with sec-
tion 101(a)(5), for it "did not confine itself to a mere statement or
citation of the written regulations . . .[but] contained a detailed
statement of the facts. . . that formed the basis for the disciplinary
action."'10
Since Hardeman, many decisions have followed the principles it
union constitution which the member was charged with violating were too ambiguous to
define an offense. This ambiguity meant that § 101(a)(5) had been violated, for a charge could
not be specific when it specified "the violation of a rule which itself [was] not sufficiently
specific." Id. at 3. The court's examination of the union constitution seems to be precisely
that "futile exercise" which Hardeman proscribes. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
1*1 Jacques v. Local 1418, Longshoremen, 246 F. Supp. 857, 859 (E.D. La. 1965); accord,
Gleason v. Chain Serv. Restaurant, 300 F. Supp. 1241, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see Null v.
Carpenters Dist. Council, 239 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Tex. 1965). See also Etelson & Smith, supra
note 12, at 742.
02 Jacques v. Local 1418, Longshoremen, 246 F. Supp. 857, 859-60 (E.D. La. 1965); accord,
Gleason v. Chain Serv. Restaurant, 300 F. Supp. 1241, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Etelson &
Smith, supra note 12, at 742.
" Gleason v. Chain Serv. Restaurant, 300 F. Supp. 1241, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see
Jacques v. Local 1418, Longshoremen, 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. La. 1965); Etelson & Smith,
supra note 12, at 742.
,04 01 U.S. at 245, quoting Hearings on Labor-Management Reform Legislation Before the
Joint Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5,
at 2285 (1959) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
"1 401 U.S. at 245.
106 Id.
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reaffirmed. In Smith v. American Federation of Musicians,'°7 the
court noted that Hardeman had not changed the requirement that
the notice of charges be specific."es In that case, the union's notice
was deficient because "no 'circumstances' or 'time' or 'place'
[were] specified in the charges on which [the member] was found
guilty.""1 9 A similar result was reached in Cefalo v. Moffett, 10 where
the union's notice was held not to have satisfied the specificity
requirement because it contained "no specification of time, place or
circumstances surrounding the alleged infraction.""'
One decision since Hardeman has held that the notice provided
lacked the requisite specificity because the member was disciplined
for conduct other than that contained in the charge. Eisman v.
Baltimore Regional Joint Board of Amalgamated Clothing
Workers112 involved a member who was charged with conduct unbe-
coming a union member at a union meeting and was subsequently
expelled. In examining the sufficiency of the notice, the court noted
that it was undisputed that the member was expelled for additional
reasons not set forth.13 Since there was no way to determine whether
the union would have expelled the member had it considered only
the events of the meeting, the court had "no choice but to conclude
that the [member] was prejudiced by the determination of the
[union] to expel him based in whole or in part upon facts and
allegations not within the scope of the written charges ..
An issue not considered by the Supreme Court in Hardeman is
whether the fact-that an accused member has independent knowl-
edge of the details of his alleged offense softens the requirement of
notice of specific charges. Several early cases had held that such
knowledge made it unnecessary for a union to give a member a
complete factual statement of the charges."' These decisions have
80 L.R.R.M. 3063 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
' Id. at 3067.
,0 Id.
110 78 L.R.R.M. 2112 (D.D.C. 1971).
'" Id. at 2114. See Charron v. American Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Employees,
79 L.R.R.M. 2635 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd 470 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1972), where the court held
that the specificity requirement was met because the notice of charges contained the specific
dates and the specific amounts that the member was accused of using improperly. Id. at 2636.
£12 352 F. Supp. 429 (D. Md. 1972).
Id. at 435.
"' Id. at 436.
215 Null v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 239 F. Supp. 809, 815 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Vars v.
International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943 (D. Conn.), affd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1963); see Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 743.
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been criticized as disregarding "the plain mandate of the statute
that 'written specific charges' shall be served."" Furthermore, since
most union constitutions provide for specific written notice, there
is little excuse for failure to comply with the statute."7 Finally, such
a rule is unsatisfactory because it fosters "litigation on the extent
of the member's actual knowledge pertaining to the charges.""'
These criticisms are cogent and, fortunately, several more recent
decisions have held that an "ex post facto showing that the accused
had knowledge of the events surrounding the alleged offenses cannot
cure the lack of adequate written notice made mandatory by the
statute.","9
B. Reasonable Time To Prepare a Defense
The second procedural guarantee of section 101(a)(5)(B) is the
right of an accused member to "a reasonable time to prepare his
defense."'' 0 The applicable law with respect to what constitutes a
reasonable time has been concisely reviewed elsewhere,' 1 and re-
cent developments have produced no significant changes. As noted,
there are apparently no cases in which courts have held less than a
week's notice to be a reasonable time,' and none where a three-
"' Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 743.
117 Id.
'is Id.
"I Gleason v. Chain Serv. Restaurant, 300 F. Supp. 1241, 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); accord,
Smith v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 80 L.R.R.M. 3063, 3067 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Magelsson
v. Local 518, Plasterers, 233 F. Supp. 459, 461 (W.D. Mo. 1964). Whereas Gleason, Smith
and Magelssen seem to eliminate the "exception" to the specificity requirement based on the
accused member's independent knowledge of the charge, there is another exception which,
according to some commentators, apparently is still viable - "a defective notice is 'cured' if
the member thereafter secures a bill of particulars clarifying or enlarging upon the charges
that have been brought." Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 742. See Magelssen v. Local
518, Plasterers, 233 F. Supp. 459, 461 (W.D. Mo. 1964) (dictum); Rosen v. Painters Dist.
Council 9, 198 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal dismissed, 326 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1964).
As the commentators note, this exception is not only "eminently reasonable," but also is
consistent with § 101(a)(5)'s purpose of requiring "full notice without excessive attention to
detail." Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 743. As they also point out, it "seems irrelevant
whether the initiative for the bill of particulars comes from the member or from the union,
so long as the member has a reasonable time to prepare his defense after receiving satisfactory
notice." Id. at 742 n.77, 742-43.
' See note 2 supra.
2 Etelson & Smith, supra note 12.
' Id. at 743. Cf. Simmons v. Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1017 n.9 (4th Cir.
1965) (district court held union violated reasonable time requirement by failing to give full
week's notice; the court of appeals found a more significant violation and did not review this
ruling); Jacques v. Local 1418, Longshoremen, 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. La. 1965) (seven days'
notice unreasonable); Deluhery v. Marine Cooks Union, 211 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Cal. 1962)
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week period or longer has been held unreasonably short.1rs
In determining what constitutes a reasonable time, the courts
have considered various factors affecting a member's ability to pre-
pare his defense, including the adequacy of the notice,"I the availa-
bility of help from union members or counsel,1 2whether the mem-
ber obtained a postponement of the trial,' 26 and whether the mem-
ber was prejudiced by the length of time allowed.1r Significantly,
the courts have also been influenced by time limitations prescribed
by the union, especially when embodied in its constitution or by-
laws.rs
(three and one-half hours unreasonable); Nelson v. Painters Local 386, 47 L.R.R.M. 2441, 41
CCH Lab. Cas. 16,755 (D. Minn. 1961) (one day's notice of changes in trial procedures held
unreasonable).
'2 Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 743-44. See McAfee v. UAW, 71 L.R.R.M. 2515 (E.D.
Mich. 1969) (over a month held a reasonable time); cf. Jacques v. Local 1418, Longshore-
men, 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. La. 1965) (dictum) (union obligated to give 20 days' notice, as
specified in constitution); Carroll v. Musicians Local 802, 235 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(reasonable time found whereas a result of continuances, hearing was not held until 29 days
after notice); Rosen v. Painters Dist. Council 9, 198 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). appcal
dismissed, 326 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1964) (three and one-half months held to be a reasonable
time). But see Smith v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 80 L.R.R.M. 3063, 3067 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (despite three weeks' notice, court found evidence to support a charge of lack of reason-
able time).
1u Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 744. See Rosen v. Painters Dist. Council 9, 198 F.
Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal dismissed, 326 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1964); cf. Vars v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943, 948 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1963) (member's knowledge of facts and circumstances held relevant).
' Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 744. See Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers,
215 F. Supp. 943, 948 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963); Rosen v. Painters Dist.
Council 9, 198 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), appeal dismissed, 326 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1964).
121 Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 744. See Caraballo v. Union de Operadores y Can-
teros de la Industria del Cemento de Ponce, 55 L.R.R.M. 2787, 2788, 49 CCH Lab. Cas.
13,784 at 30, 805 (D.P.R. 1964); Rosen v. Painters Dist. Council 9, 193 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), appeal dismissed, 326 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1964).
127 Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 744. See Burke v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers,
57 CCH Lab. Cas. 12,496 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (whether evidence sought would have been
admissible); Vras v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943, 948 (D. Conn.),
aff'd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963). The authors also note that other important factors might
be "the gravity of the offense charged, the amount of free time the member had available to
prepare a defense, the formality of the proceedings, and any special circumstances known to
the union." Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 744.
121 Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 744. See Simmons v. Local 713, Textile Workers,
350 F.2d 1012, 1017 n.9 (4th Cir. 1965); Falcone v. Dantinne, 288 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(dictum); Jacques v. Local 1418, Longshoremen, 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. La. 1965); Vras v.
International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943, 948 (D. Conn.), ofl'd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d
Cir. 1963). When the constitution and the bylaws are silent, the court may give some weight
to the union's interpretation of its statutory notice obligation. See Null v. Carpenters Dist.
Council, 239 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Tex. 1965). Presumably, requirements in either form are
chosen with some view to the needs of members of the particular organization.
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C. Full and Fair Hearing
The general requirement in section 101 (a) (5) (C) of a "full and fair
hearing"'1 1 is not amenable to precise definition. It is clear that the
process that is "due" a member is not the strict requirements of a
criminal prosecution, 130 but strong parallels can and will be drawn
between union proceedings and administrative law due process. At
present, however, administrative due process has not been fully
transplanted into the union hall.
1. Right to an Open Hearing.-The right to a "full and fair
hearing" does not necessarily contemplate an open hearing. As
stated in McCraw v. United Association of Journeymen &
Apprentices: "I
The closing of the door to the hearing room does not appear to
have deprived the plaintiff of the right to be heard nor of the
right to present his witnesses, nor does it necessarily reflect
upon the impartial nature of the hearing, but it rather appears
to be a reasonable rule to secure an orderly hearing."'
As the court indicates by implication, the closed hearing is suspi-
cious and might indicate other areas of unfairness, but standing
alone does not constitute unfairness per se.
2. Right to Be Present, Speak, Call Witnesses, and Confront
Accusers.-Even prior to the LMRDA, some courts required as a
prerequisite to union discipline that the member be present and
that he be allowed to speak and confront his accusers.' The post-
LMRDA cases have uniformly imposed this requirement. In Yochim
v. Caputo, '31 plaintiffs were not allowed to testify in their own behalf
or to present favorable witnesses. Naturally, it was held that a "fair
hearing" cannot be conducted under such circumstances, In
Anderson v. Brotherhood of Carpenters,35 plaintiff was not present
12 See note 2 supra.
'' Null v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 239 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Smith v. Local 467,
Truck Drivers, 181 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
M 216 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), affd, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965). See Nelms v.
United Ass'n of Plumbers, 405 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1968).
M' 216 F. Supp. at 661.
In Cloan v. Braun, 191 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See also Shemoff v. Schimol, 28
L.R.R.M. 2377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951); Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the
Courts do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 203 (1960).
,3, 53 L.R.R.M. 793 (D. Minn. 1963). See also Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1963).
"1 51 L.R.R.M. 2516 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886,912 (4th Cir. 1963);
Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1961); Hart v. Local
[Vol. 9: 383
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when his accusers appeared before the trial committee. Plaintiff was
later admitted to the hearing, testified, and presented witnesses in
his own behalf. The court found that the denial of the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers denied the plaintiff a "fair
hearing." The Fifth Circuit, however, has upheld cross-examination
by the hearing officer rather than the member himself.", Moreover,
although there is a right to be present at the hearing, to speak, to
call witnesses, and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
each of these rights can be waived by a member who fails to take
advantage of them during the hearing.3 7
3. Stenographic Record.-An accused union member has the
right to compel the taking of a stenographic record of the discipli-
nary proceeding. It has been asserted that this is "one of the more
essential procedural protections recognized under the
[LMRDA].11 39 Such a record is important because it enables the
reviewing bodies to examine the evidence actuallyconsidered at the
hearing, to determine whether the member was afforded adequate
safeguards, and to detect bias or improper conduct among members
of the hearing board.
It goes without saying that the transcript should be complete.
However, omissions not directly related to the charges or issues
considered at the hearing will not in fact prejudice the member.",,
Thus, such omissions do not constitute violations of section
101(a)(5). In addition, as with other rights under section 101(a)(5),
this one too may be waived.' This principle is especially significant
1292, Carpenters, 341 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Allen v. Iron Workers Local 92,
47 L.R.R.M. 2214, 2223 (N.D. Ala. 1960). See also Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 745.
46.
13, Nelms v. United Ass'n of Plumbers, 405 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1968).
137 Degan v. Tugmen's & Pilots' Ass'n, 84 L.R.R.M. 2569 (D. Ohio 1973); Kuykendall v.
Local 1763, Carpenters, 56 L.R.R.M. 2455 (D. Wyo. 1964); McCraw v. United Ass'n of Jour-
neymen, 216 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Tenn. 1963). See Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 746.
'n E.g., Hart v. Local 1292, Carpenters, 341 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Deacon
v. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 59 L.R.R.M. 2706, 2709 (S.D. Cal. 1965); Jacques v. Local 1418,
Longshoremen, 246 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. La. 1965); cf Kiepura v. Local 1091, Steelworkers,
358 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Il. 1973), where the court, although refusing to hold "that the use of
a court reporter [was] a necessary element of a full and fair hearing," did hold that under
the circumstances before it "the refusal to allow the plaintiff to supply a court reporter at
his own expense was an abuse of discretion which did tend to deprive him of such a hearing."
Id. at 992.
' Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 751.
"' Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd, 320
F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1967).
"I Falcone v. Dantinne, 288 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Pa. 1968), reu'd on other grounds, 420 F.2d
1157 (3d Cir. 1969).
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since, although the primary responsibility for furnishing a report is
with the union, if the member assumes this responsibility and then
fails to secure the services of a stenographer, courts may assume
that the right to a record was waived.'
4. Evidentiary Support of Findings.-Another right possessed
by union members under the "full and fair hearing" standard is the
rule that any finding against them must be supported by the evi-
dence, although it is well established that the quantum of evidence
needed is not as great as the "preponderance" required in a civil
action. In Vars v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, "I the
court held that there need be only "some evidence to support the
charges made"'44 and that the courts have the authority to review
the record to this extent in order to protect union members from
"obvious abuses."'45 A more strict standard would have contravened
the principle that the "courts are not free to substitute their judg-
ment for that of the trial court or to re-examine the evidence to
determine whether it would have arrived at the same conclusion
that was reached by the trial body.""'
The "some evidence" requirement established by the Vars court
has been universally followed'47 and recently was expressly adopted
by the Supreme Court in the HardemanI decision, The Court em-
phasized that any lesser standard would render the requirement of
specific written charges meaningless.'49 A more stringent standard,
on the other hand, "would be inconsistent with the apparent con.
gressional intent to allow unions to govern their own affairs, and
would require courts to judge the credibility of witnesses on the
basis of what would be at best a cold record."'5 0
1,2 Id. at 727.
" 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963).
" Id. at 578.
145 Id.
146 Id.
1,7 Accord, Lewis v. American Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Employees, 407 F.2d
1185, 1195 (3d Cir. 1969); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 199
(5th Cir. 1968); see Charron v. American Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Employees, 79
L.R.R.M. 2635, 2636-37 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1972); Burke v.
International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 302 F. Supp. 1345, 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1967), afl'd, 417 F.2d
1063 (9th Cir. 1969). But see McKee v. Sales Drivers, Local 166, 82 L.R.R.M. 3128 (C.D. Cal.
1973), wherein the court emphasized that it found "substantial evidence" to support the
decision of the union tribunal.
141 International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 246 (1971).
", Id.
'3'Id. Accord, Charron v. American Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Employees, 79
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5. Right to Counsel.-Union constitutions and bylaws often ex-
pressly permit union members to be represented by fellow members
in disciplinary hearings, but deny the right to have outside legal
counsel. The courts have sustained such provisions. In Smith v.
General Truck Drivers, Local 467, 51 for example; the court flatly
stated that "the right to be represented by counsel, guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment. . . does not apply to hearings before labor
unions."'52 In Cornelio v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, '53 the
court explained its rationale:
The legislative scheme for the protection of rights of individual
members of labor unions clearly contemplates, at least in the
first instance, a "within the family" procedure for resolving
intra-union conflicts. So long as both the accuser and the ac-
cused are placed on a "roughly equal footing" and are bound
by the same restriction, the accused has no cause for complaint
in the fact that he is limited to being represented at the trial
by a member of the United Brotherhood family. Denial of assis-
tance of counsel is of even less significance as it bears upon the
requirement of a (fair hearing) where, as here, the trial body is
made up of union members who, in all likelihood, will not be
"learned in the law."'
u
Implicit in this discussion are two important points. First, if the
union is represented by counsel, maintenance of a "roughly equal
footing" and a "fair hearing" will demand representation for the
accused.55 Second, the accused has an absolute right to lay coun-
sel. "'56 The courts, however, are yet to reach the issue as to whether
and to what degree the lay counsel must be "competent counsel."157
L.R.R.M. 2635, 2636-37 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1972).
"1 181 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
152 Id. at 17. Accord, Buresch v. IBEW Local 24, 343 F. Supp. 183, 191 (D. Md. 1971);
Sawyers v. Grand Lodge, Machinists, 279 F. Supp. 747, 756 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Comelio v.
Metropolitan Dist. Council, 243 F. Supp. 126, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1965), af'd per curiam, 358 F.2d
728 (3d Cir. 1966).
"' 243 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1966).
'" 243 F. Supp. at 129.
'" See Air Line Stewards Local 550 v. Transport Workers Union, 55 L.LM. 2711 (N.D.
Ill. 1963), reo'd on other grounds, 334 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1964); In re Hunt, 45 L.R.R.M. 2993
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960); Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 746. Summers, supra note 133, at
203.
' Sawyers v. Grand Lodge, Machinists, 279 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Etelson &
Smith, supra note 12, at 746-47.
157 Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 747-48.
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Cornelio must be compared with the Supreme Court decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly,1 8 in which the Court dealt with the due process
requirements of state administrative proceedings. Citing Powell v.
Alabama,'59 a criminal case, the Court said:
[T]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel ....
We do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-
termination hearing, but only that the recipient must be al-
lowed to retain an attorney if he so desires. Counsel can help
delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an or-
derly manner, conduct cross-examination and generally safe-
guard the interests of the recipient.'60
This argument has similar application to union disciplinary hear-
ings. At present, however, no trend has developed in the direction
of applying the Goldberg rationale to the union disciplinary hearing
situation.'6 ' Regardless of whether the distinctions between "in
house" union proceedings and state action depriving individuals of
governmental largess justify different roles for legal counsel, at the
very least lay counsel is virtually indispensible for transmitting es-
sential communications between the accused and the prosecuting
officials, for reducing the risks that personal animosity might cloud
the issues and influence the outcome, and for providing actual and
psychological support in both the investigation and presentation of
the member's case. 6 2
6. Impartial Tribunal.-The due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment forbids a criminal trial before a judge who has
a direct, personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome."' Adminis-
trative due process likewise requires hearings before tribunals that
are not improperly biased or prejudiced.' 4 So also, a "full and fair
hearing" under section 101(a)(5)(C) demands an impartial union
tribunal.'65 Statement of the rule is simple; but its application is
's 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
' 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
260 397 U.S. at 270.
,' See Buresch v. IBEW, Local 24, 343 F. Supp. 183 (D. Md. 1971), which was decided
subsequent to Goldberg v. Kelly and reaffirmed the Smith and Cornelio doctrine that a "full
and fair" hearing under § 101(a)(5)(C) does not require legal counsel.
6I Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 747.
'3 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
"I4 American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); Note, Prejudice and the
Administrative Process, 59 Nw. U.L. Ra,. 216 (1964).
165 Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 748.
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quite difficult. Few men burdened with judging fellow men do so
without a background of experiences, biases and prejudgments. In-
deed, "[t]he great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men
do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by."' 6 The law
has attempted, however, to distinguish between a "generalized atti-
tude" of prejudice that is unavoidable and thus permissible, and a
"particularized hostility" that is prohibited.' 7 Perhaps this distinc-
tion is even more necessary in the relatively closed world of the
union. Often disciplinary action is the outgrowth of an intra-union
dispute, and those who sit in judgment of the member, or choose the
ones who do, are the persons most at odds with the accused. The
accused member is often known, if not notorious, to all of the union
leadership and most of the membership. On one hand, the statute
will not tolerate "kangaroo courts" based solely on the prejudg-
ments of the tribunal; on the other hand, unions must be permitted
disciplinary powers, and common sense dictates that if absolute
neutrality is demanded, the ability to try improper conduct will be
emasculated.
Disqualifying hostility or partiality has been classified into two
basic categories. First are tribunals whose very structure permits a
"built-in bias" the finding of which requires reversal regardless of
any inquiry into the actual personal prejudice of the members. Sec-
ond is subjective bias of a member of an otherwise properly struc-
tured -tribunal.'68
The most common area for litigation involves structural defects,
which themselves can be divided into categories. The first class of
cases deals with defects in the organization of the trial system that
will always produce improper conflicts, regardless of the surround-
ing facts and circumstances. One example of this per se structural
defect is where the prosecuting official is on the hearing tribunal.'
A variation on this theme was presented when the same person who
served on an initial tribunal and prepared the report recommending
expulsion also served as chairman of a second commission reviewing
M B. CARaozo, THE NATuRE OF THE JUDiCIL PROCESS 167-68 (1921).
"7 W. GEo.RN & C. BYSE, supra note 66, at 948.
,, Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 748.
' Kuchler v. Local 24, Lithographers, 473 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1973); Simmons v. Local 713,
Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965); Air Line Stewards, Local 550 v. Transport
Workers' Union, 55 L.R.R.M. 2711 (N.D. M. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 334 F.2d 805 (7th
Cir. 1964). See Note, The Right to an Unbiased Tribunal in Union Disciplinary Proceedings,
49 N.C. L. REV. 164 (1970). Administrative law also demands a strict separation of functions.
Prosecutors may not adjudicate. See Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
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the recommendation. The court concluded that the second hearing
was not impartial because the official serving on both commissions
must have "prejudged" the case by the time of the second hearing.U"
Structural defects occasionally are not apparent on their face, and
surface only when particular circumstances arise. For example, the
charging party may sit on the tribunal,'7' or a member of the tri-
bunal may be a witness against the accused.'72 In both cases impar-
tiality is destroyed. Similarly, a union president may not sit on a
tribunal that is trying charges of slandering the union president and
a tribunal composed of members personally appointed by the presi-
dent is likewise inherently biased. ' On the other hand, impartiality
is not necessarily destroyed because those preferring charges are
union officers or respected members of the union.' Even when the
governing council, as a corporate body, prefers charges, it is permis-
sible for individual members of that council to serve on the trial
board that adjudicates the charges.'75
The second major area of impartiality involves individual bias
unrelated to structural defects. Here the issue is factual, the ques-
tion being whether the individual member's prejudice amounts to
more than a "generalized attitude." Given the potential for political
conflicts within unions, this type of bias has been found to exist
when one political adversary sits in judgment of another. In
Needham v. Isbister,'75 the court found that a member had not
received a fair hearing because five of the seven members of the
70 Cefalo v. Moffet, 78 L.R.R.M. 2112 (D.D.C. 1971). But see Parks v. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886,
911-13 (4th Cir. 1963).
"I Air Line Stewards, Local 550 v. Transport Workers' Union, 55 L.R.R.M. 2711 (N.D. Ill,
1963) rev'd on other grounds, 334 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1964); Barry v. Franscona, 28 L.RR.M.
2480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
,72 Kiepura v. Local 1091, Steelworkers, 358 F. Supp. 987 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
I" Lanigan v. Local 9, IBEW, 327 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1964). See also, Cohen v. Rosenberg,
262 App. Div. 274, 27 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1941), affd, 287 N.Y.S. 800, 40 N.E.2d 1018 (1942).
174 Falcone v. Dantinne, 420 F.2d 1157, 1160 (3d Cir. 1969); Burke v. International Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 57 CCH Lab. Cas. V 12,496 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Cornelio v. Carpenters Metropoli.
tan Dist. Council, 243 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.
1966).
115 Null v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 239 F. Supp. 809, 815 (S.D. Tex. 1965). This decision
is of doubtful validity but has been justified on two grounds. First, a council composed of
several members is "less likely to be dominated by personal prejudices and motivations than
are individual officers of the union." Etelson & Smith, supra note 12, at 749. Second, if
council members were forced "to disqualify themselves whenever they were personally famil.
iar with the events in question, unions, and particularly small local organizations where the
members share a close working arrangement with each other, would often be unable to take
any disciplinary action." Id.
"1 84 L.R.R.M. 2105 (D. Mass. 1973).
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union tribunal were political enemies "who wanted [him] elimi-
nated as a political factor."' 7 7 In Kiepura v. Local 1091,
Steelworkers,178 the court noted that the plaintiff had been a candi-
date for union office and planned to run again; thus, the present
officers and those appointed by them could hardly be considered
impartial or disinterested. 7 9 In such situations, the inference of per-
sonal bias is irrefutable and is tantamount to a structural defect.
Perhaps the leading case finding individual bias is Falcone v.
Dantinne.180 In that case the plaintiff was suspended from the union
for allegedly encouraging members not to return to work after the
union had reportedly reached a tentative agreement with manage-
ment, pursuant to which they were urging members to return to
work. Prior to his formal hearing, an informal meeting was held as
provided in the union's constitution, at which a member of the trial
body testified: "We asked Mr. Falcone to simply admit his guilt,
because it was obvious that it appeared by the evidence that he was
guilty by all evidence possible. . . ." "s Initially, the court made it
clear that the informal procedure had no per se built-in bias. The
court refused to find "any inherent impropriety in having a unibn
officer who attends and participates in the informal meeting subse-
quently sit as a member of the trial body as a finder of fact."''
Nonetheless, the court sustained the plaintiff's allegation of actual
bias, relying on the clear evidence that one member of the trial body
had, in fact, reached a decision as to his guilt prior to the formal
proceeding.
Proof of individual bias, apart from institutional built-in bias, is
indeed quite difficult. Few hearing panel members will be suffi-
ciently candid or ill-advised to express their prejudices, and the
courts have not been willing to infer individual prejudice on slight
evidence. For example, the committee chairman who referred to
"our witness" or the "committee witness" was not disqualified for
subjective bias. 1 Merely showing that the tribunal might have been
"1 Id. at 2114.
' See note 173 supra.
'7 See generally Reily v. Hogan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct.), affid, 264 App. Div. 855, 36
N.Y.S.2d 423 (1942).
420 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1969).
" Id at 1161.
18 Id.
In Anderson v. Brotherhood of Carpenters, 59 L.R.R.M. 2684 (D. Minn. 1965).
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prejudiced in favor of the prosecution will not suffice; actual pre-
judgment is necessary.'84
In summary, the courts in applying section 101(a)(5)(C) must
continue to insist on basic fairness of the hearing tribunals, but this
requirement must be tempered with the knowledge that Congress
desired internal resolution of intra-union disputes. Thus, demands
of absolute neutrality must yield to pragmatic realities. On the
other hand, unions may not rest assured in the assumption that
courts will not demand unbiased tribunals of purity equal to, if not
exceeding, those found in public administrative law. In many
unions there is no independent judiciary responsible for union dis-
ciplinary hearings. Officers are frequently involved in the dispute
underlying the charges. An officer may even be the prosecuting
party or an interested witness. He may sit on the hearing panel or
designate those who do. This merging of functions must end if un-
ions desire to pursue judicially sustainable discipline.
Constitutions and by laws may be altered in any of several ways
to establish independent judiciaries. One method by which this goal
could be accomplished would be the appointment of an independent
umpire. Also, smaller unions might resort to the common ad hoc
arbitration method, wherein each party selects a member of the
panel, and the two selected appoint the impartial chairman. These
persons could be drawn from the membership at large and thus keep
the dispute "internal." If the union would dain to use "outside"
participation, non-member neutrals could be selected through the
auspices of the American Arbitration Association or the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service. Whatever the means utilized,
however, both the courts and the unions must do their part to see
that the statutory design functions-the courts by not being exces-
sively demanding of pristine neutrality and the unions by providing
a structure wherein reasonable neutrality can be assured.
V. CONCLUSION
During section 101(a) (5)'s quarter century of existence, the judi-
cial interpretations accorded it have in general furthered its goal of
achieving participatory union democracy. Holding the preemption
doctrine inapplicable opened the doors of the federal courts to ag-
" Burke v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 57 CCH Lab. Cas. 12,496 (N.D. Cal.
1967); Null v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 239 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Tex. 1965). See Etelson &
Smith, supra note 12, at 750.
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grieved union members. Broadening the definition of "discipline"
effectively to include interference with the employment relationship
and deprivation of the right of candidacy greatly extended the scope
of the section's protection. Finally, the manner in which the courts
have construed the procedural safeguards granted by the section
demonstrates that arbitrary union disciplinary proceedings will no
longer be tolerated. In total, it may safely be concluded that section
101(a)(5), as construed by the courts, promises to fulfill the basic
functions contemplated by its framers.
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